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Abstract: There is evidence that risk-taking behavior is influenced by prior monetary gains and losses. When 
endowed with house money, people become more risk taking. This paper is the first to report a house money 
effect in a dynamic, financial setting. Using an experimental method, the authors compare market outcomes 
across sessions that differ in the level of cash endowment (low and high). Their experimental results provide 
strong support for a house money effect. Traders’ bids, price predictions, and market prices are influenced by 
the amount of money that is provided prior to trading. However, dynamic behavior is difficult to interpret due 
to conflicting influences. 
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Over the last two decades evidence from economics and psychology experiments 
has had a significant impact on financial models of asset pricing.  Perhaps the most 
notable influence is Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, which provides a 
descriptive model of decision-making under risk.  According to the model, people derive 
utility from gains and losses in wealth, rather than from the absolute level of wealth.  
Utility functions are concave in the domain of gains (implying risk aversion) and convex 
in the domain of losses (implying risk seeking).  Although aspects of prospect theory are 
increasingly applied in efforts to understand asset pricing,1 Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) themselves recognize that their theory was developed for one-shot gambles.  
Prospect theory is about individual decision-making, rather than asset pricing in dynamic 
financial markets.  As Hirshleifer (2001, page 1577) notes, translating evidence from 
psychology experiments to financial decision-making is not at all obvious.  In this paper 
we provide experimental evidence in this regard as a guide for future theoretical work.2   
As financial markets are inherently dynamic, application of prospect theory to 
financial settings requires further evidence concerning decision-making in sequential 
contexts.  Some evidence is provided by Thaler and Johnson (1990) in their experimental 
examination of how individual behavior is affected by prior gains and losses.  
Importantly, they conclude that prior outcomes influence real monetary decisions.  An 
initial loss can cause an increase in risk aversion such that prior losses reduce risk-taking 
behavior.3  In contrast, after a prior gain people are more risk seeking. This is referred to 
as a “house money” effect, in reference to casino gamblers who are more willing to risk 
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money that was recently won.  Although Thaler and Johnson’s evidence appears to 
contradict prospect theory, it instead contradicts the hypothesis that sequential gambles 
are integrated, rather than segregated.  Integration implies that the outcomes of successive 
gambles are merged whereas with segregation the outcomes may be evaluated separately. 
The evidence provided by Thaler and Johnson provides important insight into 
how individuals make sequential decisions.  People do not necessarily merge the 
outcomes of distinct gambles.  Others also document a house money effect on individual 
behavior (Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990) and Gertner (1993)).  However, in 
public good experiments, Clark (2002) reports no evidence of house money effects on 
peoples’ choices of voluntary contributions.  Our paper is the first to empirically examine 
house money effects in a market setting. 
We examine sequential behavior in a real financial setting in which traders’ 
decisions affect their monetary earnings as well as the earnings of other participants.  An 
experimental method affords control over extraneous factors and allows us to gain insight 
into the market outcomes that result from the complex interactions of individuals making 
financial decisions.  In our experiment we examine the impact of the house money effect 
on asset pricing in a multi-period setting.  The results are striking.  Traders who are given 
a greater windfall of income at the start of a market session bid higher in order to acquire 
the asset, and thus, the resultant market prices are significantly higher. 
Because of the sequential nature of our market experiment, we also examine how 
price dynamics evolve after changes in the wealth of the market.  Aspects of prospect 
theory are embedded in financial models, yet our understanding of sequential behavior in 
a market setting is far from complete.  For example, in the model put forth by Barberis, 
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Huang, and Santos (2001) investors derive utility from consumption and changes in 
financial wealth.  Investors are loss averse so that they are more sensitive to decreases 
than to increases in wealth and, thus, prior outcomes affect subsequent behavior.  
According to Barberis, Huang, and Santos’s model, people are less risk averse after stock 
prices increase because the gains cushion subsequent losses, whereas after stock prices 
fall, people are concerned about further losses and become more risk averse.  We 
empirically examine whether the behavior of traders in our markets is consistent with 
higher prices after increases in wealth and, conversely, lower prices after decreases in 
wealth.   
Some recent experimental research has examined implications of prospect theory 
in market and individual environments.  In exchange economies in which only losses can 
occur, Myagkov and Plott (1997) document risk seeking behavior in losses for 
individuals and markets, consistent with prospect theory.  However, when outcomes 
involve gains and losses, Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990) and Levy and Levy 
(2002) report individual behavior that is inconsistent with prospect theory. 4  People can 
gain or lose when transacting in financial assets and only positive or only negative 
outcomes are not the norm.  Dynamic behavior in our experimental financial markets 
with mixed outcomes appears to be influenced by competing forces.  In general, we find 
that changes in wealth have no consistent, significant effect on market pricing.   Our 
results suggest that applying aspects of prospect theory to model dynamic financial 
market behavior is problematic.   
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the 
experimental method and predictions.  Section II provides the experimental results.  
Section III contains a discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
I. Experimental Method and Predictions  
 We conduct nine experimental sessions, each consisting of a series of markets.  In 
each market eight participants compete via a sealed-bid auction to acquire an asset having 
a one-period life.  The asset is referred to as a stock.  The experimental design, to be 
described subsequently, is summarized in Table I. 
A. The experimental environment  
Across the sessions we vary the initial endowment: low versus high.  Participants 
are endowed with $60 in sessions 1-5, referred to as the low endowment treatment.  
Participants’ endowments are increased to $75 in sessions 6-9, referred to as the high 
endowment sessions.  Across all sessions, the endowment is house money in that it is 
money participants keep and is not returned to the experimenter.  The endowments are 
high relative to the opportunity cost of a student’s time in order to ensure that the 
endowment is valued and viewed as significant “found money" by the participants 5   
Each of the first five sessions includes six three-period markets, and the last four 
sessions include eight three-period markets.  Otherwise, the markets in all sessions are 
both identical and simple.  At the beginning of each market, participants are endowed 
with cash and then four single-period shares of a stock are allocated among the eight 
participants using a Vickrey (1961) auction.  At period-end the stock pays a dividend of 
either $0 or $40, each with equal chance of occurrence.  Hence, the expected payoff is 
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$20 per period.  The four highest bidders purchase the asset at the fifth highest bid.  
Clearly the wealth of those purchasing shares is affected.  As long as the market price is 
between $0 and $40, trader wealth is negatively (positively) affected when the dividend is 
$0 ($40).  By obvious extension, the wealth of a market as a whole is similarly affected 
because half of all traders (four out of eight) have their wealth affected (negatively or 
positively) and the other half experience no change.   
 
B. Experimental predictions 
The purpose of the experiment described above is to test for a house money effect 
in a dynamic market setting.  According to the house money effect, people are more 
willing to take risk after prior gains.  To examine the impact of prior gains, we compare 
behavior across our low endowment (1-5) and high endowment (6-9) sessions.  In our 
experimental setting market valuations are revealed using an n-th price or Vickrey 
auction.  Vickrey (1961) argues that it is in the interest of bidders to bid their willingness 
to pay in this type of auction.  With larger monetary endowments, or more house money, 
market valuations will reflect greater risk taking.  Traders with larger endowments will be 
more willing to gamble to acquire the stock, which translates into a higher market price 
for the stock.  On this basis market prices are expected to differ across the two treatments.   
 
Hypothesis 1: The market price is higher when traders’ endowments are larger. 
 
In testing hypothesis 1 we compare market prices across the low and high endowment 
treatments.   
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Subsequent behavior is examined by looking at price changes in response to 
changes in market wealth.  As a subset of the traders acquires the stock and the stock 
pays a positive dividend with a probability of 50%, incorporating the prior evolution of 
the market is important.  Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) assert that people are less 
risk averse as their wealth rises because prior gains cushion subsequent losses. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The average price is increasing in the wealth of the market. 
 
In testing hypothesis 2, we focus on how market prices respond to prior changes in 
market wealth.   
 
C. Experimental procedures 
 All participants are university students in their third or fourth year of study.  All 
are business majors currently enrolled in or who have successfully completed an average 
of 8.3 finance and economics courses.  The average age of participants is 21.9 years and 
none took part in more than one session.  At the beginning of each session, participants 
receive a set of instructions and follow along as an experimenter reads aloud.6  Sessions 
1-5 (6-9) consist of six (eight) three-period markets.  Participants are given tickets on 
which to record their bids for the stock.  Prior to the beginning of each market period, 
participants are also asked to predict the purchase price of the stock for the upcoming 
period.  Participants record their predictions on the confidential bid tickets.  Participants 
are instructed that the roll of a die determines the dividend paid to asset holders at period 
end.  If the roll of the die results in 1, 2, or 3, the dividend is $0, otherwise the dividend is 
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$40, so that each dividend is equally likely.  Participants are invited to examine the die at 
any time. 
The bidding procedure works as follows.  All eight participants submit sealed bids 
for the stock by recording the amount of money they are willing to pay for one share of 
stock.  The four shares are allocated to the four highest bidders at the fifth highest bid.  
After the shares are allocated, one of the traders is specifically asked to observe the 
experimenter toss the die to ensure confidence that the dividend payment is randomly 
determined. 
At the conclusion of the first period, the second period commences and four 
shares of an identical single-period stock are auctioned off in the exact same fashion.  A 
trader’s cash balance is carried forward across periods within a market.  As before, 
subsequent to allocation with a Vickrey auction, a die roll determines payout.  A third 
period follows with identical procedures.  The advantage of this approach is that it is 
possible to generate a reasonable number of identical dividend evolutions.7   
Six or eight markets are conducted in a similar manner bringing the session to a 
close.  The traders’ endowments are reinitialized at the beginning of each market.  
Subjects are told at the outset that they will be paid based on the results of only one of the 
markets, and this market is chosen by a die roll (or, in the case of sessions 6-9, by a card 
draw).  Since ex ante the students have no way of knowing the identity of the payout 
market it is in their interest to treat all markets equally seriously. 
Participants’ experimental earnings include their cash endowment, less payments 
to acquire stock, plus dividends earned on stock held in the one randomly selected 
market.  In addition, the participant with the lowest absolute prediction error in the 
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randomly selected market receives a bonus of $20.  At the beginning of each period, 
participants are informed that the participant with the lowest sum of the three absolute 
prediction errors in the selected market will receive the bonus.  The incentive is provided 
to motivate participants to conscientiously report price predictions.  The absolute 
prediction error for each participant is calculated as the absolute value of the difference 
between the observed price and the prediction. 
At the conclusion of each session, participants compute the amount of cash they 
will receive and complete a post-experimental questionnaire.  The purpose of the 
questionnaire is to collect general information about the participants and how they view 
the experiment.  To assure anonymity and confidentiality, participants are called to the 
front of the room to collect their cash in an envelope. 
The average compensation across sessions 1-5 (6-9) is $66.75 ($79.66).  
Participants’ responses on a post-experiment questionnaire indicate that they found the 
experiment interesting and the monetary incentives motivating.  Participants responded 
on an eleven-point scale as to how interesting they found the experiment, where 1 = not 
very interesting and 11 = very interesting.  The mean response is 8.5.  Participants also 
responded on an 11-point scale as to how they would characterize the amount of money 
earned for taking part in the experiment, where 1 = nominal amount and 11 = 
considerable amount.  The mean response is 7.9. 
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II. Empirical results 
A. Market Pricing 
Table II reports the test results for hypothesis 1.  The average initial price in the 
low endowment sessions is $17.10, while the average in the high-endowment sessions is 
$20.37.  The difference between the two is statistically significant at p < 0.05.  Our 
results are consistent with a house money effect in a financial setting.  Market prices are 
higher when traders have more found money.  Further, the statistics reported in table II 
indicate that, compared to the low endowment sessions, average prices in the high 
endowment sessions are also significantly higher in periods 2 and 3 at p < 0.05.  Thus, 
the house money effect persists over time. 
Table II also reports information concerning bids across the three trading periods.  
The average bid in the first trading period in the low endowment sessions is $19.70.  For 
the high endowment sessions, the average initial bid is $24.95.  The difference between 
the two average bids is $5.25 and is significantly different from zero at p = 0.0001.  In 
periods 2 and 3 bids are again significantly higher with greater found money, though the 
significance is marginal for period 2 (p < 0.10).  These results suggest that participants 
are willing to pay more for the stock when given a larger initial endowment, which leads 
to a higher market price. 
Table II reveals additional interesting insight into traders’ behavior.  Although 
Vickrey (1961) shows that there are incentives to bid true valuations in the n-th price 
auction, our evidence indicates that this may not always be the case.  According to Davis 
and Holt (1993), the discovery of an optimal bid by a trader requires substantial 
reasoning because the trader does not pay his bid to acquire the asset when the price is 
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the highest bid for participants who do not acquire the asset.  Whether a trader will report 
a bid that is not value revealing depends on his beliefs about others’ bids.  The minimum 
and maximum bids in both treatments suggest that some traders place very high (low) 
bids in order to make sure that they will get (not get) a share.  Others have noted that 
while the Vickrey auction provides incentives to reveal demand, the auction mechanism 
may not adequately reveal individual valuations (Knetsch and Sinden (1987)).  Extreme 
bids like $100 or $0 likely do not reflect a trader’s actual evaluation of the worth of the 
stock but these bids serve the trader’s intent to acquire or not acquire the asset. 
Traders' price predictions for the first trading period provide insight into traders’ 
expectations.  Because participants are asked to predict the market price for the current 
period, these predictions reflect what traders believe others' bids will be.  As Table II 
reports, the average predicted price in the low endowment sessions is significantly lower 
than that in the high endowment sessions in all periods, indicating that traders expect 
higher bids when the endowment is higher (p < 0.0001).  
We perform additional tests to confirm the significant difference in bids.  First, 
we modify very high or very low bids as follows.  For any bid exceeding $25, we 
truncate the bid at $25 so that any bids above $25 are assigned a value of $25.  For any 
bid below $10, we truncate the bid at $10 and set the bid to $10.8  This modification 
lowers the impact of extreme bids on the averages and adjusts for the likelihood that very 
low bids fall short of true valuations and very high bids exceed true valuations.  We then 
compare the average bids between the low and high endowment treatments.  Note that 
because we use the same modification for both treatments, if the house money effect 
indeed exists, this modification will bias the test results against finding the effect.  We 
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find that the average bid in the sessions with high endowment remains significantly 
higher than in the sessions with low endowment. 
We next examine how changes in found wealth affect market outcomes.9  Our 
results suggest that the absolute level of wealth dominates the effect of wealth changes.  
Although we document a significant house money effect in our market setting, we find 
that, in general, changes in wealth have no effect on market pricing.  First we estimate a 
regression of changes in market prices on changes in the average wealth of all traders; 
i.e., 
 
   tttttt ba ,1,1,1 WEALTHPRICE −−− +∆+=∆ ε   
 
where tt ,1PRICE −∆ is the change in price across periods t and t-1, and tt ,1WEALTH −∆  is 
the change in traders' average beginning wealth across periods t and t-1, defined as 
0.5*(dividendt-1 – PRICEt-1).10 
Table III reports the results of estimation of the regression equation.  The 
regression is estimated for each treatment and again for all sessions together.  In addition, 
the regression is estimated for changes from period 1 to period 2, changes from period 2 
to period 3, and again for all changes.  We estimate the regression separately based on 
movements across periods in order to examine how behavior evolves within a market.  In 
all cases except one, the slope coefficient is not significantly different from zero.  The 
exception occurs in low-endowment sessions for changes in wealth from period 2 to 
period 3. 
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In order to examine whether changes in wealth have a persistent influence on 
behavior, we estimate an additional regression.  We regress changes in prices for the final 
period of trading in each market on changes in market wealth over the two preceding 
periods.  Accordingly, we estimate the following regression equation: 
 
   .WEALTHWEALTHPRICE 3,22,13,23,2 ε+∆+∆+=∆ cba   
 
The results reported in Table IV indicate that changes in wealth have greater 
influence in the low endowment sessions.  The effect on prices of changes in average 
wealth lasts for more than one period in the low endowment sessions.  As with the earlier 
regressions reported in Table III, we report no significant influence of wealth changes on 
market prices in the high endowment sessions. 
 
B. Traders’ Bidding Behavior 
To provide insight into individual behavior in our markets, we extensively 
analyzed traders’ bids.  First we estimate regressions of changes in individual traders’ 
bids on changes in wealth.  As with the market price regressions reported in Table III, in 
no case is the slope significantly different from zero in the high endowment sessions.  
However, in the low endowment sessions the effect of wealth changes on bids is 
significantly positive for all treatments and periods. 
Nevertheless, further diagnostics signaled that this regression is misspecified.  
Examination of regression scatter plots indicated certain nonlinearities.  Specifically, 
fitted values at changes in wealth levels (which means traders bid high enough to receive 
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stock) reflect negative changes in bids, regardless whether the dividend was received or 
not; whereas fitted values at zero wealth changes (which means traders did not bid high 
enough to receive stock) reflect positive changes in bids.   
Knetsch, Tang and Thaler (2001) shed light on this puzzling behavior.  They 
argue that in a Vickrey auction with repeated trials, intra-marginal traders may adjust 
their bids towards the margin.  While it is not clear why this may occur, they suggest a 
kind of "peer pressure" effect whereby people lacking confidence in their own (initial) 
views on valuation move towards the consensus view.  Unfortunately the end result is 
that such effects obscure the house money effect, rendering the examination of individual 
bidding behavior less fruitful than hoped. 
 
III. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
This paper reports the results of an initial investigation of an important 
psychological finding in a financial market setting.  People appear to be less risk averse 
after a windfall of money, perhaps because the earlier gain cushions subsequent losses.  
Our experimental results provide strong support for a house money effect.  Traders' bids 
and price predictions are influenced by the amount of money they are provided with prior 
to trading.  Market prices are consistent with a house money effect in all treatments.  
However, subsequent individual and market behavior does not indicate that traders will 
pay more to acquire the asset after an increase in wealth.  Our data suggest that the 
absolute level of wealth has a dominating influence on subsequent behavior so that 
changes in wealth are inconsequential. 
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House money has a strong effect in our experimental markets.  However, further 
investigation is required to understand wealth effects in dynamic settings because 
subsequent changes in wealth impact behavior in a complicated fashion.  For example, 
behavior induced by mood may lead to outcomes at odds with the predictions of prospect 
theory.  According to the mood-maintenance hypothesis, individuals in a positive mood 
take actions to promote and protect their good mood.  When faced with a risky choice, 
positive individuals show greater risk aversion relative to those in a neutral state (Isen 
and Patrick (1983) and Isen and Geva (1987)).  By taking less risk, individuals reduce the 
likelihood of suffering a loss and, thus, are better able to maintain their positive state.  
For our study, mood maintenance works against the house money effect.  If traders are 
positive as a result of receiving a cash endowment, the feelings may lead them to take 
less risk.  Participants’ mood, however, is affected by the feedback received across 
periods (i.e., whether they acquired the stock and whether the stock paid the $40 
dividend).  
As financial models are increasingly incorporating psychological findings, 
significant future empirical research is called for.  As Myagkov and Plott (1997) argue, 
prospect theory pertains to individual decision making rather than market behavior, the 
substance of financial economics.  The predictions of psychological theory for dynamic 
market behavior are not at all clear.  Providing a basis for future theoretical modeling is a 







This table summarizes the experimental design.  Across the sessions we vary the initial 
endowment: low ($60) and high ($75).  Each session includes eight participants who bid 
to acquire a stock whose life is limited to a single period.  Sessions include six or eight 
markets with three trading periods.  
 








1 8 6 3 $60 
2 8 6 3 $60 
3 8 6 3 $60 
4 8 6 3 $60 
Low 
Endowment 
5 8 6 3 $60 
6 8 8 3 $75 
7 8 8 3 $75 
8 8 8 3 $75 
High 
Endowment 






Prices, Bids, and Predictions Across Treatments 
 
This table reports information concerning the prices, bids, and price predictions for each period in the low and high endowment 
treatments.  Along with the number of observations (N), the table reports the mean, minimum, and maximum observed value.  The 
final columns report the difference in means across the treatments and the p-value for a test of difference in means. 
 
Low Endowment Sessions High Endowment Sessions  
Period 
 






















































































































































































































Prices and Wealth Change 
 
This table reports the estimates of a regression of changes in market prices on changes in 
the average wealth of all traders; i.e., 
   tttttt ba ,1,1,1 WEALTHPRICE −−− +∆+=∆ ε   
where tt ,1PRICE −∆ is the change in price across periods t and t-1, and tt ,1WEALTH −∆  is 
the change in traders' average beginning wealth across periods t and period t-1, defined as 
0.5*(dividendt-1 – PRICEt-1).  The regression is estimated separately for each treatment, 
for all sessions together, and for three sub-samples determined by period. 
 
 N A b 
Low-Endowment Sessions    















    
High-Endowment Sessions    















     
All Sessions    





















Persistent Effects of Prior Wealth Change 
 
This table reports the results of estimation of the regression equation: 
   3,22,13,23,2 WEALTHWEALTHPRICE ε+∆+∆+=∆ cba   
where i tt ,1wealth −∆  is the difference between the trader’s beginning wealth position in 
periods t and t-1, tt ,1PRICE −∆ is the change in price across periods t and t-1, and 
tt ,1WEALTH −∆  is the change in traders' average beginning wealth across periods t and t-
1, defined as 0.5*(dividendt-1 – PRICEt-1).  The regression is estimated separately for each 
treatment and for all sessions together. 
 
 N a b c 
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1 Examples include Barberis and Huang (2001), Barberis, Huang, Santos (2001), 
Barberis, Huang, Thaler (2002), Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997), and Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995). 
 
2 Vernon Smith (1994) argues that significant observation generally precedes well-
formulated scientific theory. 
 
3 Thaler and Johnson (1990) find that in some cases, people are risk-seeking after a prior 
loss.  A subject with a prior loss will take a gamble that offers the opportunity to break-
even. 
 
4 Note that Levy and Levy’s (2002) evidence is inconsistent with prospect theory when 
the theory’s probability weighting function is ignored and with the weighting function, 
the evidence may be consistent with the theory.  
 
5 The opportunity cost of a student’s time serving as a research assistant is approximately 
$10 per hour, or $25 per session as the sessions ran for about two and one half hours. 
 
6 The instructions are available upon request. 
 
7 At the outset no dividend has been paid.  After one period passes there are two levels of 
wealth change: H and L (for a high and a low dividend).  After two payouts, there are 
three (or four if order matters) levels of wealth change (HH, HL, LH and LL).  The third-
period dividend magnitude is immaterial since it can have no influence on decision-
making for that market (because there are no more decisions to be made), and it should 
not have an impact on subsequent markets as well. 
 
8  Truncation at other values (such as $7 and $27) lead to similar inferences. 
 
9 Of course, wealth here reflects only wealth accumulated during the experiment and does 
not account for wealth brought to the experiment by participants.  Clearly participants’ 
total wealth varies significantly even across our rather homogeneous subject pool.  
However, as we are focusing on changes in behavior resulting from changes in wealth 
position there is no requirement that total wealth be measured or controlled.  In addition, 
it might be argued that a participant’s experimental earnings are small in comparison to 
total wealth.  While we agree that this is true, it only adds strength to our conclusion that 
found money has an important influence on behavior. 
 
10 Half the traders purchase the stock and each of these traders experiences a change in 
wealth equal to the dividend that is paid less the price paid to acquire the stock.  The 
remaining traders experience no change in wealth. 
 
